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ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AS REGULATORY
COMMON LAW: TOWARD CONSISTENCY IN SOLID
WASTE REGULATION
KIRSTEN ENGEL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the scope of environmental regulation expands, government is asked
to control newly discovered hazards posing health and environmental
threats similar to those currently regulated. Contrary to one's expectations,
similar threats are not always subject to similar standards. Exploiting
differences or ambiguities in statutory mandates, regulators often promulgate inconsistent environmental standards to account for disparities in
the size or wealth of the regulated entities or their perceived importance
to society.
Using the development of municipal solid waste regulations under
Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA") as a case study, this article examines how best to ensure
consistency in environmental regulation.' Under the 1984 amendments to
the RCRA, 2 Congress mandated that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgate revised management standards
for landfills that accept household hazardous waste and small quantity
generator waste. These wastes are currently exempted from regulation as
hazardous waste.' Thus, they may be disposed of in municipal landfills
rather than in special hazardous waste landfills, which are subject to the
EPA's hazardous waste regulations under Subtitle C of the RCRA. Under
the presumption that all municipal solid waste landfills accept household
hazardous waste and small quantity generator waste, the EPA proposed4
revised management regulations for all such landfills in August of 1988.
The promulgation of these regulations is expected in the near future.'
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; Attorney, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund,
Washington, D.C., 1990-present; Attorney, Solid and Hazardous Waste Division, Office of General
Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., 1987-1990.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1988).
2. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, P.L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988).
4. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58).
5. While this article was in production, the EPA promulgated the long overdue revised Subtitle
D regulations. 56 Fed. Reg. 50978 (signed by EPA Administrator William Reilly Sept. 6, 1991).
Issuance of the final rule was prompted by a deadline suit filed against the EPA by three environmental
organizations. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, Civ. Action No. 91-1105 (D.D.C. filed
May 15, 1991). Section 4010(c) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6949(c) (1988), required that the revised
criteria be promulgated by March 31, 1988.
The final rule retains many of the differences between the proposed revised criteria and the
*
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The proposed municipal landfill regulations are an example of inconsistent environmental regulations. Available data shows a rough equivalence between the health and environmental threats posed by these
landfills and those posed by hazardous waste landfills. Nevertheless, the
standards being proposed for municipal landfills are significantly less
stringent than those currently applied to their hazardous waste twins
under Subtitle C of the RCRA.
This article analyzes the legality of an agency's dissimilar treatment
of facilities posing similar threats, as exemplified in the proposed Subtitle
D regulations, from two legal approaches. It will be shown that, under
the statutory interpretation approach traditionally used by reviewing courts,
environmental regulatory consistency cannot be assured. Given the judicial
deference accorded an agency's interpretation of issues about which a
statute is silent or ambiguous, agencies have broad discretion to promulgate inconsistent regulations. Consequently, because of the ambiguity
in Congress' mandate to promulgate revised municipal landfill regulations,
this article concludes that the EPA's promulgation of inconsistent RCRA
standards could conceivably survive judicial review.
This traditional approach will be contrasted with an alternative legal
perspective, coined here as the "regulatory common law" approach. Under
this approach, environmental standards form a body of principles that
must be applied in similar regulatory contexts even if a statute is silent
or ambiguous on the exact standard mandated. This article concludes
that if the EPA's discretion was thus restricted, inconsistencies with
Subtitle C regulations would likely not survive judicial scrutiny.

RCRA Subtitle C standards discussed herein and, in fact, adds a few more. As a consequence,
EPA's issuance of the final rule does not affect this article's analysis, which is based on the
proposal. For example, the final rule retains the provision allowing the placement of groundwater
monitoring wells up to 150 meters from the landfill unit. 40 C.F.R. § 258.40(d). See infra text
accompanying note 43. The rule also retains the requirement that no financial assurance for cleanup
of spills is necessary until after the leak has occurred. 40 C.F.R. § 258.73. See infra text accompanying
notes 53-61. Finally, the final rule retains the distinction between new and existing facilities that
exempts existing landfills from certain location restrictions (such as locating in a wetland), the design
requirement, and (for up to five years from the effective date in certain localities), the groundwater
monitoring requirements. 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.12-.14 (location), 258.40 (design), 258.50 (groundwater
monitoring). See infra text accompanying notes 62-70.
The final design standard is the only significant standard changed by the EPA in the final
rule to more closely resemble the Subtitle C standard. 40 C.F.R. § 258.40. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-46. The final design standard requires that owners and operators in states without approved
programs install a composite liner (the liner required under Subtitle C) unless they petition EPA
directly for permission to follow a more lenient design. Landfill owners and operators in states
with approved programs, however, may install any design that allows them to meet maximum
contaminant levels at the point of compliance, which, as mentioned above, may be as far from
the unit boundary as 150 meters.
The final rule includes two significant departures from the Subtitle C standards not present
in
the proposed rule. These are an exemption for "small communities" from the most important
requirements (design standards, groundwater monitoring and corrective action), 40 C.F.R. § 258.1(0,
and a provision allowing the requirements to be "self-implementing," or effective without governmental oversight. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 264.90 et seq. (agency supervised groundwater monitoring
requirements under Subtitle C) with § 258.50 (self-implementing groundwater monitoring requirements
under Subtitle D).
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II.

THE PROBLEM

The Environmental Threat of Municipal Solid Waste Landfills
Of the 850 sites listed on the Superfund National Priorities List in6
May of 1986, twenty-two percent were municipal solid waste landfills.
This one alarming statistic best summarizes the environmental threat posed
by such facilities. Considering that state census data estimates the existence
of over 6,000 landfills, most of which are concentrated near populated
areas, the potential health and environmental impacts from landfills are
significant.
The risk data concerning municipal landfills is hardly more encouraging.
While careful to qualify the numbers as loose estimates, the EPA has
stated that "for landfills located within one mile of a drinking water
well" (forty-six percent of all municipal landfills), "fourteen percent pose
risks exceeding 1 x 10-, and nearly forty percent pose risks greater than
1 x 10- .7 This means that at fourteen out of one hundred municipal
landfills, an exposed individual has a greater than a one in 100,000 chance
of contracting cancer in his or her lifetime.' Of the eight constituents
monitored in this study, the three most important contributors to these
risk numbers are vinyl chloride, 1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane, and dichloromethane. 9
The EPA also reported in 1988 that 500 municipal landfills violated
state groundwater protection standards, 845 violated state air standards,
and 660 were cited for having contaminated surface water."' Out of 163
documented case studies, 146 landfills were contaminating groundwater
and 73 were contaminating surface water." In 1986, the EPA estimated
that only fifteen percent of all municipal solid waste landfills had liners,
only five percent had leachate collection systems, and 2only twenty-five
to thirty percent had groundwater monitoring systems.'
More disturbing than the risk data, however, is the data that indicates
municipal solid waste landfills are nearly as toxic as hazardous waste
landfills. Comparisons of the concentration of hazardous constituents in
the leachates from municipal landfills as opposed to the leachates from
3
hazardous waste landfills are not significantly different.' For example,
when comparing the median concentrations of forty constituents common
to both types of landfills, the EPA found the concentrations to be roughly

A.

6. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,319 (1988). Statistics also show that older landfills pose the greatest environmental threat. Most of the landfills on the national priorities list were in operation before
1980. Id.
7. Id.at 33,320.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 33,319.
1i. Id.
12. Id.
13. "Leachate" is defined by EPA regulation as "any liquid, including any suspended components
in the liquid, that has percolated through or drained from hazardous waste." 40 C.F.R. § 260.10

(1990).
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similar, with only a "weak indication that the hazardous waste leachate
had higher concentrations of hazardous constituents" than the municipal
14
landfill leachate.
Significantly, even municipal solid waste landfills constructed after 1980
have leachates similar in toxicity to leachates from hazardous waste
landfills. Were this similarity limited to municipal landfills in operation
before 1980, the results would not be so alarming. EPA regulations
requiring the disposal of hazardous waste at designated hazardous waste
facilities became effective November 19, 1980. Prior to this date, hazardous waste of all types was routinely disposed of in municipal landfills.
Thus, while municipal landfills in operation prior to November of 1980
are expected to have fairly toxic leachate, those constructed after 1980
are not. Nevertheless, in a comparison of the median concentrations of
pre-1980 and post-1980 municipal landfill leachates, the EPA found "little
evidence of a difference based on starting date."' 5
Once it is understood that much hazardous waste may legally be disposed
of in municipal landfills, these specific results are less mysterious. Two
significant exceptions exist to the general rule that all hazardous waste
must be disposed of in special hazardous waste disposal facilities: (1)
household hazardous waste; and (2) small quantity generator waste. Congress specifically exempted these wastes from RCRA Subtitle C hazardous
waste regulation. 6 Thus, even after the EPA promulgated hazardous
waste disposal regulations in 1980, these specific hazardous wastes could
continue to be disposed of in ordinary municipal landfills. While the
data is by no means conclusive, household hazardous waste and small
quantity generator wastes may be responsible for the similarities between
the toxicity of municipal solid waste landfill leachates and hazardous
waste landfill leachates.
B.

Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Regulation

1. Pre-1984 RCRA Amendments
Congress' concern over precisely this loophole in the nation's hazardous
waste regulations resulted in a requirement in the 1984 amendments to
the RCRA for new comprehensive management regulations for municipal
solid waste landfills. 7 Existing federal regulation of municipal landfills

14. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE,

SUMMARY OF

DATA ON MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDF.L LEACHATE CHARACTERISTICS-CRITERIA FOR MUNICPAL
SOLID WASTE LANDILS (40 C.F.R. PART 258)-SuBTrLE D OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND
RECOVERY ACT at 4-7 (1988) (Draft). The EPA performed this comparison by creating ratios of

the concentrations of the forty constituents at hazardous waste landfills versus the concentrations
at post-1980 municipal solid waste landfills. The agency found that about one-half of the ratios
were near the value of one. The number above this increment was about twice that below the
increment, providing only a "weak" indication that hazardous waste landfills had higher concentrations of hazardous constituents. Id.
15. Id. at 4-5.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(d), 6921(i) (1988).
17. Id. § 6921.
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had, by that time, been largely discredited as wholly inadequate. Relying
on state and local government initiatives, the success of RCRA Subtitle
D had faltered on a combination of state and local government reluctance
to impose the necessary environmental controls, weak federal regulation,
and an ineffective enforcement scheme.
The centerpiece of the 1976 RCRA solid waste program was the "state
plan."" 8 Section 4003 of the RCRA identified the minimum requirements
for state plans: (1) resource conservation and recovery; (2) prohibiting
the opening of new "open dumps"; (3) closure of all existing "open
dumps"; and (4) disposal of all solid waste in a "sanitary landfill" or
in an environmentally sound manner.' 9 Section 4002(a) of the RCRA
required the EPA to promulgate guidelines for the development of such
plans. 20 A state that both prepared a plan containing the statutory minimums specified under section 4003 and promulgated regulations that
complied with the federal guidelines (as21required under section 4006) was
eligible for federal financial assistance.
The 1976 RCRA statute also called for direct federal regulation of
solid waste facilities. Section 4004(a) directed the EPA to promulgate
criteria for disposal of solid waste which would assure "no reasonable
probability of adverse effects on health or the environment.'' 22 A facility
which meets these criteria is considered a "sanitary landfill" rather than
an "open dump." ' 23 Under section 4004, effective within six months of
the promulgation of the federal criteria, each state plan was required to
prohibit the establishment of new open dumps and to require the disposal
of nonhazardous solid waste in sanitary landfills. Under section 4005,
the RCRA directly prohibited any act of "open dumping." In addition,
under section 1008(a), the EPA was required to issue minimum criteria
establishing what solid waste management practices constitute "open
dumping."' 2 Under section 4005, all open dumps were to be upgraded
or closed. 25 The upgrading or closing of open dumps was to be accomplished by states with the help of an inventory of all open dumps published
by the EPA. Finally, section 4005(a) directly prohibited the act of open
dumping. 26
A number of factors coalesced to render these provisions wholly inadequate to address contamination from municipal landfills. First, with
the elimination of federal financial aid under section 4007 of the Act,

18. Id. §§ 6941-6949a.
19. Id. § 6943.
20. Id. § 6942(b).
21. Id. § 6947.
22. Id. § 6944(a).
23. Id.
24. Id. §§ 6907, 6944(a). The EPA satisfied the statutory mandates of both sections by promulgating the Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and Practices, 40 C.F.R.
§ 257 (1990).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a) (1988).
26. Id.
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the major incentive for states to develop such plans disappeared.27 By
late 1987, the EPA had fully approved only twenty-five state plans and
partially approved only six others. 28 Thus, open dumps, constituting both
aesthetic blights and health and environmental hazards, continued to exist
far beyond the closure dates anticipated by Congress. 29
Second, the EPA's criteria for sanitary landfills lacked certain key
provisions necessary to prevent future contamination and to remediate
existing contamination. The criteria, which addressed the areas of floodplains, endangered species, surface water and groundwater, disease, and
safety, generally consisted of broadly-worded performance standards.30
No monitoring of any kind was required. As a result, there was no
assurance that contamination could be checked before significant degradation had already occurred. Another significant gap was the lack of
any requirement to clean up contamination once detected. Finally, the
criteria did not require protective measures after the landfill was closed.
According to a 1987 survey, only the regulatory programs of some states
included provisions to fill these critical gaps in the federal criteria.'
2. Post-1984 RCRA Amendments
When Congress amended the RCRA in 1984, it made Subtitle D a
prime target. Congress realized that because the exemption of some
hazardous wastes from Subtitle C regulation, many municipal waste
landfills were really pseudo-hazardous waste landfills. The legislative history of the Solid and Hazardous Waste Amendments of 1984 demonstrates
Congress' awareness that while municipal landfills are the "recipients of
unknown quantities of hazardous waste," the "construction, siting, and
monitoring standards for these facilities are either nonexistent or far less
restrictive than those governing hazardous waste disposal facilities. "32
The new amendments required that the EPA revise its existing federal
regulatory criteria for all solid waste facilities that receive hazardous
household wastes or hazardous wastes from small quantity generators.
The revisions were to be "those necessary to protect human health and
the environment," although they "may" consider the "practicable capability" of such facilities.33 At a minimum, Congress specified that the
criteria must require the same environmental controls found in the Subtitle
C regulations, namely, groundwater monitoring, location requirements
for new and existing facilities, and corrective action. 34 Finally, Congress
abandoned the state plan concept and required that states apply for

27. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 1-2 (1988).
28. Id. at 1-3.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 6945 (1988).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3 (1990).
31. See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,320-21 (1988).
32. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmN. NEWS 5649, 5688.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 6949a (1988).
34. Id.
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federal approval to administer5 a permit-type program which implemented
the new federal regulations.
3. A Comparison of RCRA Subtitles C and D Standards
In its 1984 amendments, Congress intended to close the gap between
those standards applicable to landfills that are designated to receive
hazardous waste and those solid waste landfills that happen to receive
exempted hazardous wastes. The language of the statutory mandates for
the EPA's regulations for the two types of facilities are now nearly
identical. Under Subtitle C, the EPA is required to promulgate standards
for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste "as may be
necessary to protect human health and the environment. ' 36 With the
exception of the express authorization to consider "practical capabilities,"
the EPA's Subtitle D regulations must also be those "necessary to protect
human health and the environment ....
,,37 This similarity in the statutory
standards makes sense. As noted above, available data shows a similar
health and environmental threat posed by the two types of facilities
regulated under the two subtitles.
According to the EPA's proposed Subtitle D regulations, however, the
agency's conception of what is "necessary to protect" health and the
environment at municipal landfills radically differs from what it considers
necessary to ensure the same level of protection at hazardous waste
facilities. Although the categories of environmental controls proposed in
the revised Subtitle D criteria-location, design, groundwater monitoring,
corrective action, closure, and financial responsibility-mirror those found
in the EPA's Subtitle C standards, the substance of these controls are
generally much less stringent. In fact, the use of similar categories of
environmental controls in the two sets of standards masks very real and
important distinctions.
The following are actual examples of how the proposed municipal
landfill regulations differ in their standard of protectiveness from hazardous waste landfill regulations. For simplicity, the discussion is limited
to major differences.
a. Design Standards
Under RCRA Subtitle C, the design of a hazardous waste landfill is
largely dictated by statute. Under two provisions added to the RCRA
by the 1984 amendments, Congress itself specified the landfill design
''necessary to protect human health and the environment" under the
broad regulatory mandate of section 3004(a).38 According to the amend-

35. Id. § 6926.
36. Id. § 6924.
37. Id. § 6949a(c).
38. That Congress was fulfilling the standard of section 3004(a) in specifying these technological
requirements is evident from the language of section 3004(o)(1) which states, "[t]he regulations
under subsection (a) of this section shall be revised from time to time to take into account
improvements in the technology of control and measurement. At a minimum, such regulations shall
require [installation of a double liner and leachate collection system]." 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1) (1988).
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ments, virtually any landfill must install a double liner and a leachate
collection system consisting of two liners that prevent the migration of
constituents, the lower of which consists of three feet of clay with a
permeability of not more than 1 x 10- 7 centimeters per second.3 9 The
EPA has not exercised the discretion provided by the statute to alter
this design. Rather, the agency has codified section 3004(a)'s requirement
to "protect human health and the environment" and stated that4 the
statutory design standard may be used to satisfy this requirement. 0
Rather than Subtitle C's technological design standard, the EPA proposed a performance standard for Subtitle D. Under the proposed rule,
new municipal landfills must be designed with liners, a leachate collection
system, and a final cover as necessary to meet an overall individual
cancer risk from exposure to groundwater in the range of 1 x 10-4 to
1 x 10-7.41 The risk posed by any given landfill is to be measured by
found in the
combining the risks posed by all hazardous constituents
'42
groundwater at the landfill's "point of compliance.
A comparison of the stringency of the Subtitles C and D design
standards is hindered by the fact the former is a technological standard
and the latter is a performance standard. Because the EPA has never
determined the risk level achieved by its Subtitle C design standard, it
is not possible to conclusively determine whether the Subtitle D performance standard will require a more stringent design than the double
liner and leachate collection system required under Subtitle C. Nevertheless, because the cancer risk posed by the landfill dictates the landfill's
design, and this risk is measured at a point up to 150 meters from the
landfill edge, 43 it is likely that the design will be less protective. The
EPA has conceded that placement of the point of compliance at a distance
from the landfill edge "allows contaminant concentrations to diminish
(due to degradation, dispersion, and attenuation) over distance and, thus,
potentially decrease[s] the stringency of design criteria needed to meet
the design goal." 44
Furthermore, because of the authorization of a 150 meter compliance
point, the Subtitle D performance standard is inherently less protective
than that required under Subtitle C. The Subtitle D standard allows the
contamination of the groundwater aquifer, as well as soil and surface
water lying within a 150 meter radius of the landfill edge.
Another major difference between the two sets of standards is the
restriction of the design criteria under Subtitle D to new facilities. 45

39. Id. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i).
40. EPA's use of the term "may" demonstrates that, although it believes the statutory design
standards meet the requirement of protecting "human health and the environment," they may not
be "necessary" to meet this requirement.
41. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,351-52 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.40).
42. Id. at 33,351-52. The point of compliance is either the edge of the landfill unit or an
alternative boundary established by the state up to 150 meters from the landfill edge. Id. at 33,352.
43. Id. at 33,410-11 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.40).
44. Id. at 33,352.
45. Id. at 33,325.

Winter 19901

STATE EXCLUSION OF GARBAGE

Existing municipal landfills, which are likely to pose the greatest health
and environmental threats because they may have received all types of
hazardous wastes prior to 1980, are not required to retrofit with liners
and a leachate collection system. Only fifteen percent of existing municipal
landfills have any liner at all, natural or synthetic. 46
b. Groundwater Monitoring and Corrective Action
The routines mandated by the groundwater monitoring requirements
in effect under Subtitle C and proposed under Subtitle D are similar.
Both require the monitoring of lists of indicator parameters or hazardous
constituents which, if detected in sufficient concentrations, trigger a requirement for additional monitoring or the cleanup of the contamination.4 7
Nevertheless, significant differences exist between the two regimens.
One difference, the distance between the boundary of the landfill and
the designated point of compliance, has already been mentioned. 48 Under
Subtitle C, the point of compliance, and hence the place where groundwater monitoring wells are installed, 49 must be located at the hydraulically
downgradient edge of the landfill unit. 0 This assures the earliest possible
detection of a leak from the unit as contaminants cannot disperse prior
to being detected at the compliance monitoring wells. On the other hand,
the EPA's proposal to allow states to designate a point of compliance
for municipal landfills up to 150 meters from the landfill unit boundary
reduces the instances where contamination will actually be detected. This
distinction is not merely academic. Groundwater monitoring is the linchpin
of the cleanup or corrective action program, dictating if and when
corrective action must be conducted.
Placement of the point of compliance beyond the landfill boundary
will also reduce the extent of whatever corrective action is conducted.
Under both Subtitle C and proposed Subtitle D, only contamination
leaking beyond the point of compliance must be remediated. By allowing
any distance between the landfill boundary and the point of compliance,
the EPA is basically writing off that area to contamination as, at least
under the RCRA, it will never have to be cleaned up. The Subtitle D
standard, which may forever destroy the pristine nature of a large land
area surrounding a municipal landfill, cannot be deemed as environmentally protective as Subtitle C, if protective at all.

46. Id. at 33,319.
47. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 264.90-.101 (Subtitle C standards for permitted facilities) and 40
C.F.R. § 265.90-.94 (Subtitle C standards for unpermitted facilities) with 53 Fed. Reg. 33,411-15
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.50).
48. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
49. See proposed 40 C.F.R. § 258.51(a) (referring to the point of compliance established under
proposed § 258.40); 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,411 (1988).
50. EPA regulations state that the point of compliance is the hydraulically downgradient limit
" 40 C.F.R. § 264.95(a) (1990). The waste management area,
of the "waste management area ..
in turn, is the horizontal plane where waste is placed during the active life of the unit. Id. §
264.95(b). If the facility contains more than one unit, the waste management area is described by
drawing an imaginary line around all the landfill units. Id. § 264.95(b)(2).
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As to human health, the protectiveness of the Subtitle D standard will
depend upon the current and future use of the area surrounding the
landfill. Assuming that the land is forever used for waste disposal and
the contamination never strays from these artificial man-made boundaries,
two very large assumptions, the potential human health threat may be
minor. However, if the facility is one day used for another purpose,
such as residential development, or if the sitting contamination finds its
way into connected aquifers or simply eludes groundwater monitoring
wells placed 150 meters from the landfill boundary, the threat to human
health may be significant.
How much of the environment must be cleaned up once corrective
action is triggered is another significant difference between the Subtitle
C and proposed Subtitle D regulations. While Subtitle C requires the
clean up of all environmental media, including soil, surface water, and
air," the EPA is proposing to require only the cleanup of groundwater
contamination under Subtitle D.5 2 The result at Subtitle D facilities will
be that the soil underlying contaminated areas subject to corrective action
outside the point of compliance will continue to harbor contaminants
even after the contaminants are removed from the groundwater.
Financial Responsibility
The Subtitle C and proposed Subtitle D financial responsibility requirements demonstrate obvious inconsistencies. Financial responsibility
refers to insurance policies, bonds, guarantees, or other instruments that
must be secured to finance the known or potential costs of operating a
landfill. While they do not themselves govern how wastes are managed
at a landfill, financial responsibility requirements are widely regarded as
environmental standards because they assure the funds necessary to implement health and environmental controls or to pay for the clean up
of contamination.51 In recent years, Congress has consistently required
that financial responsibility regulations be a component of regulatory
54
schemes designed to protect human health and the environment.
Under Subtitle C, owners and operators of hazardous waste landfills
must obtain financial assurance for the costs of closure, post-closure
care, and bodily injury and property damage to third parties resulting
from accidental occurrences or contamination releases at a landfill.55 The
c.

51. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 264.101(a) (1990); see also EPA's proposed Subtitle
C corrective action regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798 (1990).
52. See generally 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314 (1988).
53. The contrary view that the owner or operator will still be subject to the operating and
corrective action requirements regardless of whether he or she obtains financial responsibility is
generally discredited by the existence of the option of declaring bankruptcy. Moreover, in one sense,
financial responsibility requirements can be said to govern the management of wastes. For example,
insurers often require compliance with certain management standards prior to issuing policies.
54. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1988) (hazardous waste); id. § 6991(b) (underground storage
tanks).
55. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140-151 (permitted facilities), 265.140-265.150 (interim status facilities)
(1990).
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assurance must be in the form of an insurance policy or other financial
instrument, the exact wording of which is specified by regulation. 6 A
specified minimum amount of assurance is required for liability costs
where engineering estimates are impossible. 7 Subtitle C requires that
financial assurance be secured prior to the receipt of hazardous waste
at the landfill if the facility is new, or prior to the issuance of a permit
if the facility was in operation before the effective date of the regulations. 8
Thus, the financial responsibility requirements at Subtitle C landfills are
characterized by comprehensive coverage of all aspects of landfill operation, prescriptive regulation of financial instruments, and the securing
of financial responsibility prior to permitted operation.
The proposed Subtitle D financial responsibility requirements are different on all three of these fronts. First, the scope of the contingencies
for which an owner or operator must have financial assurance is more
limited. For instance, the EPA .is proposing to require only assurance
for the cleanup of releases, not for third party bodily injury or property
damage.5 9 Furthermore, no financial responsibility need be obtained unless
the release is "known" or has been discovered. 6° This allows the construction and operation of landfills which may not have sufficient financial
resources to cover the costs of cleaning up a future release. Finally, the
proposed requirements are phrased as performance standards. In contrast
to the current Subtitle C standards, the wording of the financial instruments is not specified by regiilation.6
d. New Versus Existing Facilities
Significant discrepancies exist between the rigor of the standards applied
under Subtitle C and proposed Subtitle D standards with respect to new
and existing facilities.6 While the standards for existing Subtitle C landfills
are, as a rule, less stringent than those applied to new landfills, Subtitle
D lacks certain requirements for existing Subtitle D landfills. Moreover,
while existing Subtitle C landfills must eventually comply with the more
stringent requirements applied to new facilities, Subtitle D landfills may
never be subject to regulation. These distinctions are all the more significant when it is remembered that older municipal solid waste landfills
have been determined to pose the greatest health and environmental
63
threat.

56. See, e.g., id. § 264.151(e).
57. Id. § 264.143.
58. See, e.g., id. § 264.143(a)(3)(i).
59. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,409-10 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.32).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In this discussion and under RCRA regulations generally, a "new" facility refers to a facility
that begins operation after the effective date of the regulations. Correspondingly, an "existing"
facility refers to one in operation as of the effective date of the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 260.10
(1990).
63. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (1988).
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The distinctions between new and existing landfills under Subtitle C
are largely the result of accommodating the statutory prohibition of
hazardous waste disposal without a permit. 64 Acknowledging that the wait
for a permit might be lengthy, the EPA allowed such facilities to continue
operation so long as they had applied for a permit and complied with
minimum standards in each category for which the EPA had promulgated
a permitted standard.65 While generally subject to less stringent requirements, the "interim status" landfills are at least subject to some type
of health and environmental control standards. These standards are often
strict. For instance, most interim status landfills must retrofit to install
the same double liner and leachate collection system required at a new
facility.6 If contamination is detected, interim status landfills may be
required to follow the same stringent corrective action regimen applied
to new landfills. Interim status provides, at most, a temporary break
from the full Subtitle C requirements applied to new landfills. If they
do not close down first, interim status landfills are eventually required
to comply with the more stringent requirements applied to new landfills
once it is time for them to obtain a permit.
In contrast, under the proposed Subtitle D standards, existing landfills
are forever relieved of complying with most of the requirements applicable
to new municipal landfills. For instance, most location restrictions are
applicable only to new units.67 In addition, existing units are not required
to be retrofitted with liners or a leachate collection system. 61 Finally, the
EPA has proposed a delay of up to five years for the installation of
groundwater monitoring wells at existing municipal landfills. 69 Unlike
existing Subtitle C landfills accorded interim status, not even cursory
70
groundwater monitoring is required at these facilities during this delay.
e. "Practicable Capability"
As discussed above, the statutory mandates under Subtitle C and Subtitle
D are identical with the exception that, under Subtitle D, the EPA is
allowed to consider the "practicable capabilities" of municipal landfills.
Therefore, the manifold discrepancies between the Subtitle C and proposed
Subtitle D standards must be attributed to the "practicable capabilities"
of municipal landfills, if attributed to anything at all. Indeed, the EPA's
proposed rule does justify many of the Subtitle D standards on this basis,
although in a most general fashion. Most discrepancies are left totally
unexplained.
In the proposed rule, the EPA interprets "practicable capability" to
encompass both a technical component, as in the availability of particular

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1988).
40 C.F.R. § 265 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 6936(b) (1988).
53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,325 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 33,326.
Id.
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technology to address a particular problem, and an economic component,
as in the economic resources available to implement the standards. 7 '
Without explaining its criteria, the EPA has identified two classes of
municipal landfills particularly susceptible to technical difficulties or economic hardship: existing and small landfills. 72 As a result, the requirements for new versus existing landfills are varied, applying most location
restrictions and the design standards only to new landfills. 73 Finally, the
agency justifies its phase-in of groundwater monitoring requirements and
its eighteen-month effective date for the entire regulation upon the resource
demands placed by the requirements upon states and owners and op74
erators.
The EPA's attempt to justify its less stringent proposed Subtitle D
regulations is, at best, incomplete. The agency makes no attempt to
explain the majority of the differences between the design, groundwater
monitoring, corrective action, or financial responsibility regulations under
the two subtitles. Moreover, the agency never explains how economic
and technical difficulties were considered in varying the proposed Subtitle
D standards. For instance, how much of an impact was considered
sufficient to ease a standard, and by how much? The proposed rule
simply fails to address these issues.
III.

ANALYSIS

Whether the inconsistencies between the Subtitle C and proposed Subtitle
D standards are legally justified largely depends upon the legal approach
applied under judicial review. The following discussion analyzes these
RCRA inconsistencies under both traditional statutory analysis and a new
"regulatory common law" approach. This article concludes that while it
may be possible to justify such inconsistencies under the former approach,
such differences could not be justified under the latter approach.
A.

Traditional Statutory Analysis

1. The Case for Inconsistent Regulations
Section 706(2)(A) of the Administative Procedure Act governs judicial
review of informal rulemaking such as EPA's Subtitle D regulations.
Under this provision, a rule will be set aside if "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." ' 75
Application of this standard must be consistent with the leading case of
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,76
under which an agency's statutory interpretations will generally be upheld

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 33,325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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if "reasonable." Beloved by agency attorneys and loathed by their opposing counsel, the Chevron case sets forth a two-step framework for
reviewing agency interpretations of law. Under the first step, a court
must determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." '77 If Congress has, the court must "give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' '78 If Congress was silent
on the issue, or its intent ambiguous, the second step requires courts to
interpretation so long as it is a "permissible"
defer to the agency's legal
79
one.
or "reasonable"
Applying this analysis to the EPA's Subtitle D regulations, a court's
review would be limited to the deferential "reasonableness" test of Chevron's second-prong. Given the EPA's broad mandate to issue Subtitle D
regulations "necessary to protect human health and the environment"
with reference to "practicable capability," 80 Congress may not have spoken
to the "precise question at issue," i.e., the standard of protection to be
achieved by Subtitle D standards and the relationship between that standard and the standard achieved by current Subtitle C regulations.
First, RCRA contains no statutory language explicitly addressing the
issue of consistency between Subtitle C and Subtitle D regulations. Rather,
as discussed above, the regulatory mandates under the two are similar,
but not identical, because of the reference in Subtitle D to "practicable
capability."'"" Nowhere does the statute define this term. Thus, it is
impossible to determine from just the statutory language whether Congress
intended the EPA to promulgate standards under Subtitle D assuring the
same level of health and environmental protection assured under Subtitle
C.
Nor is the legislative history much more illuminating. Although replete
with references to the Subtitle C regulations, the legislative history never
explicitly states that the EPA must adopt the Subtitle C regulations for
those Subtitle D facilities that receive hazardous waste. On the one hand,
the Senate Report on an earlier bill states that the Subtitle D groundwater
monitoring requirements "can obtain the flexibility currently provided in
the Subtitle C regulations. '82 This appears to indicate that Congress
intended the EPA to promulgate Subtitle C-like standards for municipal
77. Id. at 842-43.
78. Id.
79. Id. At issue in Chevron was EPA's interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to refer to all pollution-emitting devices within a single plant as
if they were encased within a "bubble." Under the bubble concept, a plant could install or modify
one piece of equipment and not trigger the requirement to install expensive control technology at
each pollution-emitting device so long as the alteration did not increase total plant emissions. Id.
at 840. Because the Court found that Congress had not spoken on the precise definition of the
term "source," the Court upheld EPA's interpretation as a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 866. Chevron's two-step analysis has been widely followed. A few of the Court's significant
environmental decisions following the Chevron analysis are: Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S.- 116 (1985).
80. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
82. S. RaP. No. 98-284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1983).
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landfills, taking advantage of the flexibility the agency built into its
Subtitle C groundwater requirements. On the other hand, the Senate
Report also states that the multiple liner-leachate collection system requirements applicable to Subtitle C facilities "are not to be automatically
incorporated" in the revised criteria.8 3 Similarly, a co-sponsor of the 1984
RCRA amendments stated during floor debate that the "underlying standard ... to Subtitle D remains protection of human health and the
environment. Requirements imposed on facilities may vary from those
for Subtitle C facilities, however, and still meet this standard. "84 The
senator cited as an example the phase-in of the Subtitle D standards "to
take account of the practicable capability of the facilities covered.""5
The "reasonableness" of the EPA's argument that many of the inconsistencies are justified on the basis of the "practicable capability" of
certain types of landfills would appear to depend upon equating this
term with cost considerations. The legislative history does provide some
support for this view. For example, Senator Randolph stated on the
Senate floor that by allowing the EPA to consider the "practicable
capability" of facilities, Congress had expressed its intent that the agency
"avert serious disruptions of the solid waste disposal industry.' '86 Support
for Subtitle C and proposed Subtitle D inconsistencies may also be found
in section 1008(a)(3) of RCRA, which is explicitly referred to in the
revised criteria mandate.87 This provision states that the EPA's criteria
for sanitary landfills must assure that there is "no reasonable probability
of adverse effects on health or the environment from disposal of solid

waste at such facility.'

'88

Case law exists to justify using the term "reasonable" to refer to a
balancing of cost and environmental protection. For instance, in American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 9 the United States
Supreme Court stated in dicta that similar language under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act "might be construed to contemplate some balancing
of the costs and benefits of a standard."' 9
The same interpretation was made by a lower court when interpreting
an EPA-administered statute. In City of New York v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 91 the court interpreted the term "unreasonable" in the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act's
("MPRSA") statutory prohibition against permitting ocean dumping which
may "unreasonably degrade or endanger" human health or the maritime

83. Id.
84. 130 CONG. REc. S13,814 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 6949(c) (1988). This provision explicitly states that the Administrator is to
"promulgate revisions of the criteria promulgated under paragraph (1) of section 4004(a) [42 U.S.C.
§ 6944(a)] and under section 1008(a)(3) [42 U.S.C. § 6907(a)(3)] .... (emphasis added).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6944(a) (1988).
89. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
90. Id. at 512.
91. 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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environment. 92 The court held that the term inherently denoted a weighing
of the listed statutory factors, one of which was "the need for the
proposed dumping," a factor found by the court to permit consideration
of costs. 93
2. The Case for Regulatory Consistency
Even within the framework of Chevron a strong argument can be made
that the Subtitle D and C standards must be consistent. The strongest
argument is, of course, that Congress, speaking directly to this "precise
question," mandated similar standards. Such a claim rests first upon the
distinction in Congress' Subtitle D mandate to promulgate standards
necessary to protect human health and the environment on the one hand
and its mandate to consider "practicable capability" on the other. While
Congress stated that the Administrator "shall" do the former, it stated
only that he "may" do the latter.4
Congress' intent would thus appear to be that EPA's foremost priority
is to issue standards necessary to protect health and the environment.
Only after this standard has been achieved may the agency vary the
requirements based upon the practicable capabilities of individual owners
and operators. Assuming that EPA's Subtitle C requirements are those
standards the agency believes are "necessary to protect human health
and the environment" 9 from the type of threat posed by municipal
landfills, this interpretation of the revised criteria would mandate EPA's
promulgation of standards under Subtitle D that are similar to those
effective under Subtitle C.
Support for this interpretation may be found in the legislative history
of the 1984 RCRA amendments. During floor debate, one senator emphasized the precedence of health and environmental protection, stating:
"[t]he underlying standard for facilities subject to this amendment to
Subtitle D remains protection of human health and the environment."96
Other legislative history appears to limit the agency's discretion to promulgate less stringent Subtitle D standards on anything more than a temporary basis. Statements by legislators, also made during floor debate,
state that EPA may phase in the Subtitle D regulations as a means of
97
accommodating the "practicable capability" of owners and operators.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1988).
543 F. Supp. at 1104.
42 U.S.C. § 6949a(c) (1988).
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
130 CONG. REc. S13,814 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
Referring to the revised criteria, Senator Randolph stated:
They may be phased in over time, as the Administrator deems appropriate, to take
account of the practicable capability of the facilities covered .... The Administrator
could phase in new requirements other than groundwater monitoring and corrective
action over time. Phasing may be tailored to the characteristics of broad categories
of facilities. Such phasing might include, for example, imposing requirements first
on large facilities which have the greatest potential for affecting human health and
the environment in the absence of added regulatory controls. Phasing also might
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This would indicate that while Congress authorized less stringent standards
during a temporary "phase-in" period to accommodate economic constraints, the "necessary" long-term protection of human health and the
environment was not to be compromised.
Yet even if the above statutory mandate is not considered sufficiently
"precise" to prevent a court from venturing to the second step of the
Chevron analysis, it can always be argued that the promulgation of
inconsistent standards is patently "unreasonable." First, according to the
EPA's own data, the health and environmental threat posed by hazardous
waste facilities subject to Subtitle C standards is similar to that posed
by municipal solid waste facilities subject to Subtitle D. Thus, it is
patently unreasonable to apply dissimilar standards to these demonstrably
similar health and environmental threats.
Second, inconsistent standards within RCRA cannot be reasonable given
Congress' intent that RCRA standards be consistent with standards promulgated under other environmental laws. Section 1005(b) of the Act directs
the EPA to integrate its RCRA regulations "to [the] maximum extent
practicable, with appropriate provisions" of several listed Acts, as well
as "such other Acts of Congress as grant regulatory authority to the
Administrator. ' 98 While the provision fails to specify that the EPA
integrate its regulations under RCRA's own subtitles, it would be plainly
illogical to mandate the integration of regulations promulgated under
several different statutes and not those promulgated under the same
statute.
Whatever the outcome of a hypothetical legal challenge to an EPA
determination to promulgate inconsistent Subtitle D and C standards, it
is obvious that the existing structure of judicial review under Chevron
will not necessarily further the goal of consistent environmental regulation
of similar harms. Under the Chevron analysis, regulatory consistency,
arguably an inherent value in environmental law, will be achieved only
in those instances when Congress expressly mandates such consistency or
the agency chooses on its own initiative to require it.
B.

Regulatory Common Law Approach
An alternative approach to Chevron which would assure consistency
is that of "regulatory common law." Under this approach, an agency's

include imposing some requirements immediately on existing units but giving time
to meet other requirements so that facilities are not faced with all major new
requirements at once.

Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b) (1988). The Acts specifically mentioned are: the Clean Air Act, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, the
Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. See
also Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1982) (requiring that the
EPA's environmental standards for control of uranium mill tailings be consistent, to the maximum
extent practicable, with requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-91).
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discretion in developing new environmental standards is limited by the

requirement that such standards be consistent with existing regulatory
determinations under a similar congressional mandate. As a consequence,
congressional silence or ambiguity with respect to particular regulatory

controls would not function as carte blanche for the promulgation of
inconsistent regulatory standards. Rather, even in the face of such silence
or ambiguity, agencies would be bound by their prior regulatory deter-

minations. Essentially, agency health and environmental determinations
are elevated under this approach to the status of regulatory common
law. 99 Once promulgated, health and environmental standards would function as precedents binding upon the agency unless distinguished in subsequent regulatory effort.
Placed within the context of evolving standards of judicial review of

agency decisionmaking, the regulatory common law approach would most
accurately be described as a selectively-applied "ultra-hard look doctrine."
The "hard look doctrine" is the name given the more rigorous scrutiny
applied to agency decisionmaking by courts beginning in the 1970s.1'0 In

its earliest formulation, the doctrine elaborated upon the Administrative
Procedure Act's ("APA") requirement that a rule include a "concise
general statement of [its] basis and purpose."'' To ensure that agencies
had adequately considered the relevant issues, courts required that agencies
explain their reasoning process, but were generally unconcerned with the
substantive result. 1 As subsequently developed in cases such as Overton
Park v. Volpe, 103 however, the doctrine relied on the APA's

section 706(2)(A) "arbitrary and capricious" standard to engage in a
substantive review of the agency decision itself. This was openly demonstrated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance.1°4 The State Farm Court reversed the

99. "Regulatory common law" is a term coined by the author. It is being used here because
it best conveys the concept of a growing body of law consisting of agency health determinations.
The author recognizes that because the traditional domain of common law is the decrees and
judgments of the judiciary, the term "common law" may seem inappropriate in the administrative
law context. Nevertheless, the present use of "common law" is true to the term's basic definition:
"principles, usage and rules of action ... which do not rest for their authority upon any express
and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 251 (5th ed.
1979). See also Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and
the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 1101, 1144 (1988) (stating that the
procedural version of the "hard look doctrine," under which a reviewing court required the agency
to articulate its reasoning process, "had strong overtones of evolutionary common law methodology").
100. See Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. Rv. 507, 525 n.102 (1985),
according to which the origin of the term can be traced to a series of cases by Judge Leventhal:
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971); Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
102. E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II);
see also Garland, supra note 100, at 525-26; Shapiro & Levy, Heightened
Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 417-22.
103. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
104. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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Department of Transportation's rescission of a safety standard because
the Department failed to adequately justify its action. 0 5 The Court described the agency's burden in State Farm as one of articulating a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."'' 0
Like the hard look doctrine, the regulatory common law approach
would require that an agency give a reasoned explanation for its decision
to impose a particular level of health and environmental protection. The
common law approach would go beyond the hard look doctrine, however,
by insisting that the agency explain its reasons for any subsequent variation
of those standards when regulating a similar health and environmental
threat.
Such rigorous scrutiny would not be required every time a court reviewed
an agency's health and environmental protection standards. An agency's
initial determination of the level of protection required by a statutory
mandate would not be held to a higher standard of review than would
otherwise apply under Chevron. Rather, consistent with the doctrine of
stare decisis, the more exacting standard of review would apply only to
successive agency efforts to define the requisite level of protection from
a similar harm.
This selective application of a strict level of scrutiny is fully consistent
with the theoretical justification for deferential review. Deference to agency
decisions is generally justified on the basis of progressive, as opposed
to liberal, values in American government.' ° While the former favors
the rational, scientific solutions of trained government experts, the latter
favors individual initiative and rigid adherence to separation of powers.lea
Under the progressive model, deference is accorded to agency decisions
because they are presumed to be the products of rational decisionmaking.
Deference is not warranted under this model where the decision constitutes
an abrupt policy reversal, or where the agency fails to give a rational
explanation for its action.1t 9
Certainly the presumption of rationality, and thus the theoretical justification for agency deference, is destroyed when an agency applies
drastically different standards to similar health and environmental threats

105. Id. at 46-49.
106. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
107. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 102, at 391.
108. Id. at 391-94.
109. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 38; General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45
(1976) (refusing to accord deference to EEOC guideline that conflicted with earlier pronouncements
of same agency); National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S.
267, 289 (1974) (refusing to uphold new agency construction of statutory term that conflicted with
longstanding interpretation).
The Court's decision in State Farm is an excellent example of judicial review based upon the
progressive model. In rescinding the requirement that car manufacturers install passive restraints,
the new administration in the Department of Transportation reversed a prior agency position. State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 38. The Court held that the agency had failed to articulate a rational justification
for its action. Id. at 57. Obviously sensing undue influence by newly-appointed agency officials,
the Court abandoned a deferential standard of review and studied the agency's rationale for the
earmarks of a "reasoned analysis." Finding none, the Court reversed the agency's decision. Id.
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and fails to explain the basis for the distinction. Such dissimilar treatment
can be likened to the Department of Transportation's rescission of the
passive restraint requirement struck down for lack of adequate justification
in State Farm."0 Thus, the application of heightened scrutiny to inconsistent standards is in keeping with the progressive understanding of the
agency role in government.
The regulatory common law approach also finds support outside the
administrative law context in the doctrine of statutory common law. This
doctrine may be summarized as a recognition of legislative enactments
as sources of legal principles applicable to problems beyond those directly
subject to a statute's provisions. Legislative enactments have traditionally
been used as sources of common law principles."' The doctrine of "equity
of the statute" is itself a means of treating legal principles distilled from
statutory law as common law within the context of traditional statutory
construction. Under this doctrine, a court may apply a particular statutory
provision to cases that are neither expressly named nor excluded by the
law, but which are clearly within its spirit and meaning. Treatment of
statutes as sources of common law recognizes that, however particular
may be their stated application, statutes are based upon principles with
undeniable application to a variety of circumstances, not all of which
fall within the letter of the statute.
Although environmental regulations implement statutory directives, it
is unrealistic to believe they are not a source of principles and values
independent of the statute they implement. For example, a regulation
thal prohibits a facility from contaminating groundwater above a 1 x
10- level of individual lifetime cancer risk under a statutory mandate to
promulgate regulations "necessary to protect human health and the environment" is setting forth a very real value judgment that exposed
persons and the surrounding environment are "protected" or safe even
where they have a 1 out of 10,000 chance of contracting cancer as a
result of that exposure. This judgment was not made by the legislature;
the legislature merely mandated the protection of human health and the
environment. Likewise, regulations under a similar statutory mandate
requiring installation of features designed to strengthen structures containing contaminated materials, such as liners and leachate collection
systems at landfills, embody the principle that preventative measures, as
opposed to solely corrective measures, such as requiring the cleanup of
contamination once it has leaked, are "necessary" to adequately protect
health and the environment.
Just as it is naive to ignore the existence of these principles and values
in regulatory determinations, it is foolish to overlook their applicability
outside the particular statute they implement. For instance, the principle

110. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
111. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARv. LEGAL ESSAYS (1934) reprinted in 2 HAV.
J. ON LEGis. 7 (1965) (citing as examples the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations);
see also Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wisc. L. REv. 175; Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1936).
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that health and the environment are protected by preventing contamination
before it occurs rather than cleaning it up afterward applies to virtually
all regulatory efforts concerning a contamination threat.
The broad applicability of environmental regulatory determinations, in
particular, is also explained by an agency's reference to a common pool
of scientific data when promulgating regulations under different statutory
mandates. For instance, the maximum contaminant levels for certain
substances promulgated by the EPA are used as a basis for a host of
regulatory determinations under the RCRA and Superfund. Where the
data used to implement one mandate to "protect human health and the
environment" is the same as that used to implement another mandate
"to protect human health and the environment," the relevance of the
regulatory determinations of the former to the latter is obvious. Thus,
because environmental regulations, like statutory law, contain values and
judgments of general applicability and are often based upon a common
pool of scientific
data, these principles can be treated as a form of
2
common law.'
Such treatment, moreover, would have many benefits. Distillation of
regulations currently scattered throughout the Code of FederalRegulations
into a coherent body of regulatory common law would facilitate public
understanding of the principles underlying these regulations, as well as
efforts to change them. Take, for example, the hypothetical regulation
meptioned above that prohibits groundwater contamination above a I x
10- individual lifetime risk of cancer under a mandate to issue regulations
"necessary to protect human health and the environment." If an agency
is required to apply this same requirement under similar mandates with
regard to similar threats, there is an increased likelihood that the public
will be cognizant of the principle underlying it-that human health and
the environment are "protected" at a 1 x 10- risk of individual cancer.
This knowledge facilitates any effort to change the standard through
legislative, judicial or regulatory means. Furthermore, such a change will
have implications beyond the particular regulation at issue because a
successful challenge to a particular regulation based upon the underlying
standard that it embodies will effectively discredit use of the standard
in other contexts.
The application of the regulatory common law approach can be inferred
from at least one federal case. In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
United States EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated certain EPA standards promulgated under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ("NWPA")1 4 because of

112. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988) (requiring that Superfund cleanups remediate contamination to levels acceptable under the standards and criteria found in the Toxic Substances Control
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act or any other "legally applicable or
relevant and appropriate standard, requirement, criteria or limitation").
113. 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1988).
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their inconsistency with regulations promulgated by the Agency under
the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA")." 5 The NWPA standards, applied
to the long-term disposal of high-level radioactive waste in underground
depositories, included an individual protection requirement limiting the
annual exposure from the disposal system to any individual member of
the public for the first 1,000 years to no more than 25 millirems. l l6 This
level, however, was well in excess of primary drinking water standads
established under the SDWA. Pursuant to the SDWA, the EPA is obligated to assure that underground sources of drinking water are not
endangered by any underground injection. 1 7 "Endanger" is defined by
the SDWA as any injection that "may" cause a public water system to
exceed national primary drinking water standards," 8 which for man-made
radionuclides the EPA established level is four millirems. 19 The Natural
Resources Defense Council had challenged the NWPA standards as arbitrary and capricious because they allowed levels of radionuclides in
groundwater far in excess of allowable levels under the agency's own
standards under the SDWA.
In the absence of an obvious congressional policy to override the
SDWA's endangerment policy, the court found that the inconsistency
between the EPA's NWPA and SDWA standards rendered the NWPA
standards patently arbitrary. 20 The SDWA standards were the EPA's
first effort at defining the appropriate level of health and environmental
protection from the threats posed by radionuclides. Accordingly, the court
interpreted the SDWA standards as the agency's best thinking on the
issue, and flatly rejected the agency's argument that the SDWA standards
had no impact upon standard-setting under any other statute absent an
explicit consistency provision. "It is puzzling to say the least," the court
stated, "when the same agency now endorses a significantly lower standard-and does so entirely without explanation. Either the SDWA standard is much too stringent or the present standard is inadequate.''
As under the regulatory common law approach, the court's cure for
the inconsistent standards was a reasoned explanation. Because the agency
22
failed to provide one, the court invalidated the NWPA standards.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, the First Circuit treated the
SDWA standards as regulatory common law by giving them precedential
effect in the agency's development of regulations under a statutory del-

115. Id. §§ 300f-300j.
116. Natural Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1274.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(3)(C) (1988).
118. Id. § 300h(d)(2).
119. Natural Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1266.
120. Id. at 1280.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1282 (stating that reversal was the court's only alternative when "the Agency has
never even acknowledged the interrelationship of the two statutes in respect to the [SDWA standards],
and it has presented no reasoned explanation for the divergence between the level of contamination
allowed by the [NWPA] rules and the permissible levels of radiation contamination under the
SDWA").
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egation under a different statute, namely the NWPA. Moreover, the court
applied the reasoned analysis requirement. Where the agency decided not
to follow pre-existing standards for the same environmental harm, the
court directed that the agency give a "reasoned explanation" for this
departure.
Critics are bound to attack the regulatory common law approach on
several fronts. Those suspicious of agency action will regard the approach
as an easily manipulated limitation upon agency discretion. The question
of what new situations are sufficiently "similar" to require application
of an existing regulatory determination is obviously subject to debate
and potential abuse. 123 On the other hand, advocates of maximum flexibility in agency decisionmaking may complain that the approach unnecessarily limits an agency's discretion, preventing an agency from
developing creative strategies to grapple with the inherent difficulties that
attend its duty to regulate a diverse public. While the common law
approach increases the significance of administrative determinations on
environmental health and safety, it is undeniable that it also reduces an
agency's discretion in making those determinations.
Critics might also attack the approach for generating far-reaching,
unwanted impacts on statutory environmental law. For example, in mandating regulations to implement a particular statutory directive, Congress
would no longer be writing on a clean slate. Rather, unless Congress
specifically disavows the application of existing analogous regulatory
determinations or expressly distinguishes their relevance, such determinations will automatically apply under the common law approach. Thus,
regulatory common law may stifle congressional attempts to foster regulatory innovation.
The regulatory common law approach may also cause agencies to
promulgate weak health and environmental protection standards. Fearing
that it may later be forced to apply the strict standards to a recalcitrant
sector of the regulated public, an agency may veer toward promulgation
of the least stringent standards possible in the first instance. The common
law approach might thus set off a "race to the bottom" in health and
environmental protection standards.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is not clear that the regulatory common law approach would require
the EPA to promulgate regulatory standards for municipal solid waste
landfills that are completely consistent with the regulatory standards
currently applicable to the agency's hazardous waste landfills. Despite
the similarity in the directives under the statutory mandates for the two
types of landfills,' 24 Congress expressly authorized the EPA to consider

123. See Landis, supra note 111, at 10 ("Enabling judges to distill from a statute its basic
purpose, they could then employ it to slough off the archaisms in their own legal structure.").
124. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the "practicable capability" of Subtitle D facilities. 25 This distinction
provides a basis for distinguishing the regulatory controls developed under
Subtitle D.
Nevertheless, application of the regulatory common law approach will
still require a greater degree of consistency than achieved under the
traditional statutory interpretation approach. Because of the scientifically
demonstrated similarity in the health and environmental threat posed by
municipal and hazardous waste landfills, and Congress' identical mandate
to promulgate standards "necessary to protect human health and the
environment," the EPA would have to justify inconsistent regulations
on the basis of "practicable capability." The common law approach
would require that the EPA define this ambiguous statutory phrase with
some particularity and explain how it permits different levels of health
and environmental protection mandated under the two Subtitles and why
the particular differences were chosen. Certainly, the EPA's vague definition of "practicable capability" as encompassing both "economic and
technical considerations" would not suffice under the common law approach.

125. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

